Tema 1. Introducción general
Bagwell, K. y A. Wolinsky (2002). Game theory and industrial organization. En: Auman, R.J. y S. Hart (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1851-1895.
Dixon, H. (1988). Oligopoly theory made simple. En: Davies, S y B. Lyons, Economics of Industrial Organization, Essex: Long man, 127-165.
Forges, F. y J.-F. Thisse (1992). Game theory and industrial economics: An introduction. En: Norman, G. y M. La Manna, The New Industrial Economics. Edward Elgar, 12-46.
Grossman, S. y O. Hart (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of lateral and vertical integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
Holmstrom, B. y J. Tirole, (1989). The theory of the firm. En Schmalensee R. and R. Willig, Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol 1. North-Holland, 61-127.
Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston y J. Green (1995). Microecomic Theory. Oxford. (Capítulos, 7-10).
Shy, O. (1995). Industrial Economics. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulos 1 y 2).
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulos Introducción, 1 y 11).
Williamson, O. (1989). Transaction cost economics. En Schmalensee R. and R. Willig, Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol 1. North-Holland, 135-178.
Tema 2. Información perfecta y entrada en la industria
Anderson, S.P., J. Goeree y R. Ramer (1997). Location, location, location. Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 102-127.
Caminal, R. y C. Matutes (1990): Endogenous switching costs in a duopoly model. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8(3), 353-373.
Dixit, A. (1980). The role of investment in entry-deterrence. Economic Journal, 90, 95-106.
Fudemberg, D. y J. Tirole (1984). The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy and the lean and hungry look. American Economic review, 51(1), 361-6.
Wautthy, X (1996). Quality choice in models of vertical differentiation. Journal of Industrial Economics, 44, 345-353.
Katz, M. y C. Shapiro (1985). Network externalities, competition and compatibility. American Economic Review, 75, 424-440.
Martin, S. (2002). Advanced Industrial Economics, 2nd edition. Blacwell (Capítulo 8).
Matutes, C. y P. Regibaeu (1988). Mix and Match: product compatibility without network externalities. RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 221-234.
Reignanum, J. (1989). The timing of innovation: research, development and diffusion. In Schmalensee R. and R. Willig, Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol 1. North-Holland, 849-908.
Shy, O. (2001). A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costs. International Journal of Industrial Economics, 19.
Shy, O. (1995). Industrial Economics. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulos 8 y 10).
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulos 7 y 8).
Vives, X.(1999). Oligopoly Pricing. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulo 7).
Tema 3. Información imperfecta y comportamientos estratégicos
Bagwell, K. y G. Ramey (1988). Advertising and limit pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 19(1), 59-71.
Bagwell, K y G. Ramey (1997). Collusion over the business cycle. RAND Journal of Economics, 28(1), 82-106.
Fishman, A et al. (1993) Planned obsolescence as an engine of technical progress. Journal of Industrial Economics, 16, 103-113.
Grossman, S. (1980). The role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 261-483.
Kreps, D. y R.Wilson (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-79.
Lapham, B.y R. Ware (1994). Markov puppy dogs and related animals. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12 (4), 569-93.
Martin, S. (2002). Advanced Industrial Economics, 2nd edition. Blacwell (Capítulos 8, 9 y 10).
Milgrom, P. y Roberts, J. (1986). Price and advertising signals of product quality. Journal of Political Economy, 796-821.
Milgrom, P. y Roberts, J. (1982). Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis. Econometrica, 50, 443-60.
Rasmusen, E. (1988). Entry for buyot. Journal of Industrial Economics, 36(3), 281-99.
Rotemberg, J. y G. Saloner (1986). A supergame-theoretic model of price wars durgin booms. American Economic Review, 76(3), 390-407.
Shy, O. (1995). Industrial Economics. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulos 8, 11, 12 y 14).
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulos 9 y 11).
Vives, X.(1999). Oligopoly Pricing. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulo 8).
Wolinsky, A. (1983). Prices as signals of product quality. Review of Economic Studies, 50, 647-658.
Yang , B. (1996). Learning, reputation and entry deterrence: a chain-store game with correlated entrants. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14(5), 561-73.
Tema 4. Integración y joint ventures
Baker, J. y T. Bresnahan (1988). Estimating the residual demand curve facing a single firm. International Journal of Industrial Organization 6(3), 283-300.
Bresnahan, T. y S.Salop (1986). Quantifying the competive effects of production joint ventures. International Journal of Industrial Organization 4(2), 155-175.
Farell, J. y C. Shapiro (1990). Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review 80(1), 107-126.
Farell, J. y C. Shapiro (1991). Horizontal mergers: reply. American Economic Review 81(4), 1007-1011.
Hennart, J.-F. (1988). Upsteam vertical integration in the aluminium and tin industry. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9, 281-299.
Martin, S. (2002). Advanced industrial economics. Malden Massachusetts: Blackwell (Capítulo 12).
Martin, S., C. Synder y H.-T. Normann (1999). Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets.
Martin S. y A. Schrader (1998). Vertical market participation. Review of Industrial Organization 13(3), 321-331.
Mueller, D. (1985). Mergers and market share. Review of Economics and Statistics 47(2), 259-267.
Rey, P. y J. Tirole (forthcoming). A primer on foreclosure. En: Handbook of industrial organization, vol III. Nueva York: Elsevier-North-Holland.
Salant, S.Switzer, S y R Reynolds (1983). Losses form horizontal merger: the effects form an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(2), 185-213.
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (The theory of the firm).
Werden, G. (1991). Horizontal mergers: comment. American Economic Review 81(4), 1002-1006.
Tema 5. Investigación y desarrollo
Amir, R. (2000). Moddeling imperfectly appropiable R&D via spillovers. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18(7), 1013-1032.
D’Aspremont, C. y A. Jacquemin (1988). Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers. American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133-1137.
Kamien, M. y I. Zang (2000). Meet me halfway: Research joint ventures and absorptive capacity. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18(7), 995-1012.
Kamien, M., Muller, E. y I. Zang (1992). Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. American Economic Review 82(5), International Journal of Industrial Organization 18(7), 1293- 1306.
Martin, S. (2001). Spillovers, appropiability, and R&D. Journal of Economics.
Martin, S. (2002). Advanced industrial economics. Malden Massachusetts: Blackwell (Capítulo 14).
Matutes, C., K. Rockett y P. Regibeau (1996). Optimal patent design and the difusion of innovation. Rand Journal of Economics 27, 60-83.
Scherer, (1982). Demand-pull and technological invention: Schmookler revisited. Journal of Industrial Economics 30(3), 225-237.
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (Capítulo 10).
Tema 6. Estructura de la empresa
Basu, K. (1995). Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly; an expanation based on managerial incentives, Economics Letters, 49, 459-464.
Fehrstman, C y K.L. Judd (1987). Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. American Economic Review, 77, 927-940.
Gónzalez-Maestre, M. (2000). Divisionalization and delegation in oligopoly, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9, 321-338.
Martin, S. (2002). Advanced industrial economics. Malden Massachusetts: Blackwell (Capítulo 12).
Martin, S. (1993). Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model. Journal of Economic Theory 59(2), 445-450.
Miller, N.H. y A.I. Pazgal (2001). The equivalence of price and quantity competition with delegation, Rand Journal of Economics, 32, 284-301.
Mirrlees, J (1976). The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization. Bell Journal of Economics 7(1), 105-131.
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press (The theory of the firm).
Theilen, B. (2003). Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents. Economics Letters, 79, 283-289.
Williamson, O. (1967). Hierarchical control and optimal firm size. Journal of Political Economy 75(2), 123-138.
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